Plato for Dummies (I'm the Dummy)

[seattlegal]

This is my attempt to understand Western Philosophy, which often sounds like some sort of weird acid trip to me. I'm gonna try, however, even if I have to loosen my own grasp of reality.

I'm going to start with Substance Theory and The Theory of Forms.

I'm prolly gonna start sounding as if I'm rambling really quickly, so if anyone wants to jump in and clarify anything for me, please feel free to do so!

I'll be posting things here in an attempt to keep these arguments handy so I can refer back to them.

[seattlegal]

From the wiki article on Substance Theory:

In the millennia-old Aristotelian tradition, as well as early modern traditions that follow it, substances or ousia are treated as having attributes and modes or things.
This concept helps to explain, for instance, state transitions. Let us take a quantity of water and freeze it into ice. Substance theory maintains that there is a "substance" which is unchanged through this transition, which is both the liquid water and also the frozen ice. It maintains that the water is not replaced by the ice – it is the same "stuff," or substance. If this is true, then it must be the case that the wetness of water, the hardness of ice, are not essential to the underlying substance. (Essentially, matter does not disappear, it only changes form.)
The Aristotelian view of God considered God as both ontologically and causally prior to all other substance; others, including Spinoza, argued that God is the only substance. Substance, according to Spinoza, is one and indivisible, but has multiple modes; what we ordinarily call the natural world, together with all the individuals in it, is immanent in God: hence the famous phrase Deus sive Natura ("God, or Nature"). Aristotle was creating his theory of substance in response and counter to Plato's theory of framework or structures called the theory of forms.
The Roman Catholic Church has adopted substance theory as part of its theology of transsubstantiation.

OK, I can parallel this with Tao Te Ching 1

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named is not the eternal name
The nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth
The named is the mother of myriad things
Thus, constantly without desire, one observes its essence
Constantly with desire, one observes its manifestations
These two emerge together but differ in name
The unity is said to be the mystery
Mystery of mysteries, the door to all wonders

I can also see parallels to Advaita's Brahmin.


So far, so good. I can remain sane (for the moment.)

[seattlegal]

OK. here is where my madness and vexation begins:

Two primitive concepts (i.e., genuine notions that cannot be explained in terms of something else) in substance theory are the bare particular and the inherence relation.
Bare particular

In substance theory, a bare particular of an object is the element without which the object would not exist, that is, its substance, which exists independent from its properties, even if it is physically impossible for it to lack properties entirely. It is "bare" because it is considered without its properties and "particular" because it is not abstract. The properties that the substance has are said to inhere in the substance.
In substance theory of the mind, the objects are minds.
Inherence relation

Another primitive concept in substance theory is the inherence relation between a substance and its properties. For example, in the sentence, "The apple is red," substance theory says that red inheres in the apple. Substance theory considers to be clear the meaning of the apple having the property of redness or the property of being juicy, and that a property's inherence in a substance is similar to, but not identical with, being part of the substance. Thus, Aristotle wrote:

"By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject." (The Categories 1a 24-26)

The inverse relation is participation. Thus in the example above, just as red inheres in the apple, so the apple participates in red.

Regarding bare particular: The obvious (to me, at least) identification of a bare particular would be context. The definition of the notion of bare particular is "that which cannot be explained in terms of something else." This seems like a totally self-referencing circular argument to me. Am I throwing the baby out with the bathwater here? The only thing I can think of would be "name" as per Tao Te Ching 1, quoted in above post.



Inherence Relation: This just seems to be a device to further separate "name" from properties. {Not all apples (name) are red (quality,) nor are all apples juicy (quality.)}


So the question becomes: what's in a name?

[seattlegal]

OK, here is where I start thinking, "What kind of drugs are you on?"

Continuing on from wiki's Substance Theory article:

Two common arguments supporting substance theory are the argument from grammar and the argument from conception.
Argument from grammar

The argument from grammar uses traditional grammar to support substance theory. For example, the sentence, "Snow is white," contains a grammatical subject, "snow", and the assertion that the grammatical subject is white. The argument holds that it makes no grammatical sense to speak of "whiteness" disembodied, without snow or some other grammatical subject that is white. That is, the only way to make a meaningful claim is to speak of a grammatical subject and to predicate various properties of it. Substance theory calls this grammatical subject of predication a substance. Thus, in order to make claims about physical objects, one must refer to substances, which must exist in order for those claims to be meaningful.
Many ontologies, including bundle theory, reject the argument from grammar on the basis that a grammatical subject does not necessarily refer to a metaphysical subject. Bundle theory, for example, maintains that the grammatical subject of statement refers to its properties. For example, a bundle theorist understands the grammatical subject of the sentence, "Snow is white", as a referent to a bundle of properties, including perhaps the containing of ice crystals, being cold, and being a few feet deep. To the bundle theorist, the sentence then modifies that bundle of properties to include the property of being white. The bundle theorist, then, maintains that one can make meaningful statements about bodies without referring to substances that lack properties.
Argument from conception

Another argument for the substance theory is the argument from conception. The argument claims that in order to conceive of an object's properties, like the redness of an apple, one must conceive of the object that has those properties. According to the argument, one cannot conceive of redness, or any other property, distinct from the thing that has that property. The thing that has the property, the argument maintains, is a substance. The argument from conception holds that properties (e.g. redness or being four inches wide) are inconceivable by themselves and therefore it is always a substance that has the properties. Thus, it asserts, substances exist.
A criticism of the argument from conception is that properties' being of substances does not follow from inability to think of isolated properties. The bundle theorist, for example, says that properties need only be associated with a bundle of other properties, which bundle is called an object. The critic maintains that the inability for an individual property to exist in isolation does not imply that substances exist. Instead, he argues, bodies may be bundles of properties, and an individual property may simply be unable to exist separately from such a bundle.

"The argument holds that it makes no grammatical sense to speak of "whiteness" disembodied, without snow or some other grammatical subject that is white."

I disagree. By thinking of the concepts of "blackness" or "darkness," we can also invoke the idea of "whiteness" without invoking a "substance."

Pass the pipe.

[radarmark]

Yep, it is all about mind-set. And social pressure to conform (which can erase and create memories). It is just so difficult to keep an open mind (as you obviously have) about these kind of issues.

The whole substance and necessity issues are just so hard for most people to rise above. Like me in my replies to bhaktajan--I really cannot imagine "stepping outside of the universe" because I "see" universe as everything and as experiences (which whould include that imagining). Just like I really have a hard time believing in Being.

Its not that I do not intellectually understand imagination or Being. But the former (to me) is just another aspect of all there is and the latter a poor abstraction.

[seattlegal]

Originally Posted by radarmark

The whole substance and necessity issues are just so hard for most people to rise above.

Eww, do you mean that by my dipping my ToE (pun intended) in this pool, I might risk getting stuck?

Its not that I do not intellectually understand imagination or Being. But the former (to me) is just another aspect of all there is and the latter a poor abstraction.

OK, I'm highlighting this quote to use as a lifeline to pull myself out of the mire in case I get stuck.

Thanks.

[radarmark]

You won't get stuck (I have faith in you). Learn about it. Try to rise to up to the conscious mind of others who fail to see that is is just one way among msny and not the word of G!D. (good luck on that)

[seattlegal]

Originally Posted by radarmark

You won't get stuck (I have faith in you). Learn about it. Try to rise to up to the conscious mind of others who fail to see that is is just one way among msny and not the word of G!D. (good luck on that)

Thanks radarmark.

Continuing on regarding substance:

Another argument for the substance theory is the argument from conception. The argument claims that in order to conceive of an object's properties, like the redness of an apple, one must conceive of the object that has those properties. According to the argument, one cannot conceive of redness, or any other property, distinct from the thing that has that property. The thing that has the property, the argument maintains, is a substance. The argument from conception holds that properties (e.g. redness or being four inches wide) are inconceivable by themselves and therefore it is always a substance that has the properties. Thus, it asserts, substances exist.

Again, I disagree. We imagine to see all sorts of things in inkblots from the properties in the inkblots, and not the other way around. Do the inkblots contain the substances of the imagined objects we see there? If so, then why doesn't everyone see the same things in a particular inkblot?

[seattlegal]

OK, question: Is substance in the philosophical sense analogous to the concept of Meme?

From my limited (and not necessarily accurate) understanding of substance is that it is unchanging, whereas memes can change and evolve. Any clarification to my confusion would be appreciated.

[Etu Malku]

Substance comes from the Latin word substare it means "to stand under"
Hupostasis is the Greek rendition (hupo/under & histemi/to stand) has exactly the same meaning.

Substance is the essence or essential nature of something, the foundation which supports everything built upon it. In my opinion this foundation not only can change, but 'must' change . . . it is plastic.

[radarmark]

Good topic, good points. I think what we consider "substance" (and "necessity" and "truth") to be is a meme. It is mental and informational, not physics. It should be plastic. Because it has not been things like "atoms are mostly empty space" and "emptiness has an associated energy" would not freak out so many people.

[seattlegal]

Originally Posted by Etu Malku

Substance comes from the Latin word substare it means "to stand under"
Hupostasis is the Greek rendition (hupo/under & histemi/to stand) has exactly the same meaning.

Substance is the essence or essential nature of something, the foundation which supports everything built upon it. In my opinion this foundation not only can change, but 'must' change . . . it is plastic.

OK, this I can relate to. I see a constant, concentrated, pure essence as being highly reactive and unstable by these virtue of these very qualities.

Old yang (pure, therefore unstable) becomes young yin, and old yin (pure and unstable) becomes young yang.

Or, Qián begat three daughters, and Kūn begat three sons.

Bagua

[Etu Malku]

Old yang (pure, therefore unstable) becomes young yin, and old yin (pure and unstable) becomes young yang.

o_O/ I like it!

So, let's move on to First Forms! Weeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee!!

[seattlegal]

Quite a bit to digest here in this first bit:

Plato's theory of Forms or theory of Ideas[1][2][3] asserts that non-material abstract (but substantial) forms (or ideas), and not the material world of change known to us through sensation, possess the highest and most fundamental kind of reality.[4] When used in this sense, the word form is often capitalized.[5] Plato speaks of these entities only through the characters (primarily Socrates) of his dialogues who sometimes suggest that these Forms are the only true objects of study that can provide us with genuine knowledge; thus even apart from the very controversial status of the theory, Plato's own views are much in doubt.[6] Plato spoke of Forms in formulating a possible solution to the problem of universals.

Terminology: the Forms and the forms

The English word "form" may be used to translate two distinct concepts that concerned Plato—the outward "form" or appearance of something, and "Form" in a new, technical nature, that never

...assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; ... But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner....

The objects that are seen, according to Plato, are not real, but literally mimic the real Forms. In the allegory of the cave expressed in Republic, the things that are ordinarily perceived in the world are characterized as shadows of the real things, which are not perceived directly. That which the observer understands when he views the world mimics the archetypes of the many types and properties (that is, of universals) of things observed.
What are the Forms?

The Greek concept of form precedes the attested language and is represented by a number of words mainly having to do with vision: the sight or appearance of a thing. The main words, εἶδος (eidos) and ἰδέα (idea)[7] come from the Indo-European root *weid-, "see".[8] Both words are already there in the works of Homer, the earliest Greek literature. Equally ancient is μορφή (morphē), "shape", from an obscure root.[9] The φαινόμενα (phainomena), "appearances", from φαίνω (phainō), "shine", Indo-European *bhā-,[10] was a synonym.
These meanings remained the same over the centuries until the beginning of philosophy, when they became equivocal, acquiring additional specialized philosophic meanings. The pre-Socratic philosophers, starting with Thales, noted that appearances change quite a bit and began to ask what the thing changing "really" is. The answer was substance, which stands under the changes and is the actually existing thing being seen. The status of appearances now came into question. What is the form really and how is that related to substance?
Thus, the theory of matter and form (today's hylomorphism) was born. Starting with at least Plato and possibly germinal in some of the presocratics the forms were considered as being "in" something else, which Plato called nature (physis). The latter seemed as "wood",[11] ὕλη (hyle) in Greek, corresponding to materia in Latin, from which the English word "matter" is derived,[12] shaped by receiving (or exchanging) forms.
But what were the forms? In Plato's dialogues as well as in general speech there is a form for every object or quality in reality: forms of dogs, human beings, mountains, colors, courage, love, and goodness. Form answers the question, "What is that?" Plato was going a step further and asking what Form itself is. He supposed that the object was essentially or "really" the Form and that the phenomena were mere shadows mimicking the Form; that is, momentary portrayals of the Form under different circumstances. The problem of universals – how can one thing in general be many things in particular – was solved by presuming that Form was a distinct singular thing but caused plural representations of itself in particular objects.[13] Matter was considered particular in itself.
These Forms are the essences of various objects: they are that without which a thing would not be the kind of thing it is. For example, there are countless tables in the world but the Form of tableness is at the core; it is the essence of all of them.[14] Plato's Socrates held that the world of Forms is transcendent to our own world (the world of substances) and also is the essential basis of reality. Super-ordinate to matter, Forms are the most pure of all things. Furthermore, he believed that true knowledge/intelligence is the ability to grasp the world of Forms with one's mind.[15]
A Form is aspatial (transcendent to space) and atemporal (transcendent to time). Atemporal means that it does not exist within any time period, rather it provides the formal basis for time. It therefore formally grounds beginning, persisting and ending. It is neither eternal in the sense of existing forever, nor mortal, of limited duration. It exists transcendent to time altogether.[16] Forms are aspatial in that they have no spatial dimensions, and thus no orientation in space, nor do they even (like the point) have a location.[17] They are non-physical, but they are not in the mind. Forms are extra-mental (i.e. real in the strictest sense of the word).[18]
A Form is an objective "blueprint" of perfection.[19] The Forms are perfect themselves because they are unchanging. For example, say we have a triangle drawn on a blackboard. A triangle is a polygon with 3 sides. The triangle as it is on the blackboard is far from perfect. However, it is only the intelligibility of the Form "triangle" that allows us to know the drawing on the chalkboard is a triangle, and the Form "triangle" is perfect and unchanging. It is exactly the same whenever anyone chooses to consider it; however, the time is that of the observer and not of the triangle.

OK so the Forms are unchanging while the substance is malleable, but the Forms are the highest reality? (But the Forms are also substantial.) They sound more like tools. I must need a nap.

[Etu Malku]

Plato's First Forms are:
(1) independent of physical things (Forms would exist even if physical things did not exist)
(2) eternal (the fact that Forms are independent of physical things proves that Forms must “always exist,” or, in other words, be eternal)
(3) unchanging (red tomatoes, if not eaten, turn into brown tomatoes; But redness, cannot change. Even if all the red objects in the world ceased to be red, redness would not become different than it is)
(4) the source of existence for physical things (Forms make physical things the things that they are. For example, red things are red by virtue of their relationship with the Form of redness

Oddly enough it has always seemed to me that Plato was giving Life to an adjective . . . LOL!