Tibet and China

[Vajradhara]

Namaste all,

in this thread, i shall post various news reports, first hand accounts and other relevent information related to the struggle of Tibetan autonomy under Chinese occupation.

first... some history:

Introduction
Treaties in international law are binding on the countries signing them, unless they are imposed by force or a country is coerced into signing the agreement by the threat of force. This is reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is regarded as a reflection of customary international law. The People's Republic of China (PRC) feels strongly about this principle, particularly as it applies to treaties and other agreements China was pressured to sign by Western powers at a time when China was weak. The PRC is particularly adamant that such "unequal" treaties and other agreements cannot be valid, no matter who signed them or for what reasons. After the military invasion of Tibet had started and the small Tibetan army was defeated, the PRC imposed a treaty on the Tibetan Government under the terms of which Tibet was declared to be a part of China, albeit enjoying a large degree of autonomy. In the White Paper, China claims this treaty was entered into entirely voluntarily by the Tibetan Government, and that the Dalai Lama, his Government and the Tibetan people as a whole welcomed it. The facts show a very different story, leading to the conclusion that the so-called "17 Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was never validly concluded and was rejected by Tibetans. The Dalai Lama stated Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa as having told Chinese General Zhang Jin-wu in 1952:

It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been. [My Land and My People, Dalai Lama, New York, Fourth Edition, 1992, p.95]

Diplomatic activity and military threats
Soon after the Communist victory against the Guomindang and the founding of the PRC on 1 October 1949, Radio Beijing began to announce that "the People's Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan." Partly in response to this threat, and in order to resolve long-standing border disputes with China, the Foreign Office of the Tibetan Government, on 2 November 1949, wrote to Mao Zedong proposing negotiations to settle all territorial disputes. Copies of this letter were sent to the Governments of India, Great Britain and the United States. Although these three Governments considered the spread of Communism to be a threat to the stability of South Asia, they advised the Tibetan Government to enter into direct negotiations with Chinese Government as any other course of action might provoke military retaliation. The Tibetan Government decided to send two senior officials, Tsepon Shakabpa and Tsechag Thubten Gyalpo, to negotiate with representatives of the PRC in a third country, possibly the USSR, Singapore or Hong Kong. These officials were to take up with the Chinese Government the content of the Tibetan Foreign Office's letter to Chairman Mao Zedong and the threatening Chinese radio announcements still being made about an imminent "liberation of Tibet"; they were to secure an assurance that the territorial integrity of Tibet would not be violated and to state that Tibet would not tolerate interference. When the Tibetan delegates in Delhi applied for visas to Hong Kong, the Chinese told them that their new Ambassador to India was due to arrive in the capital shortly and that negotiations should be opened through him. In the course of negotiations, the Chinese Ambassador, Yuan Zhong-xian, demanded that the Tibetan delegation accept a Two- point Proposal: i) Tibetan national defence will be handled by China; and ii) Tibet should be recognised as a part of China. They were then to proceed to China in confirmation of the agreement. On being informed of the Chinese demands, the Tibetan Government instructed its delegates to reject the proposal. So negotiations were suspended. On 7 October 1950, 40,000 Chinese troops under Political Commissar, Wang Qiemi, attacked Eastern Tibet's provincial capital of Chamdo, from eight directions. The small Tibetan force, consisting of 8,000 troops and militia, were defeated. After two days, Chamdo was taken and Kalon (Minister) Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the Regional Governor, was captured. Over 4,000 Tibetan fighters were killed. The Chinese aggression came as a rude shock to India. In a sharp note to Beijing on 26 October 1950, the Indian Foreign Ministry wrote:

Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.

A number of countries, including the United States and Britain, expressed their support for the Indian position. The Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session in November 1950 at which it requested the Dalai Lama, only 16 at that time, to assume full authority as Head of State. The Dalai Lama was then requested to leave Lhasa for Dromo, near the Indian border, so that he would be out of personal danger.At the same time the Tibetan Foreign Office issued the followingstatement:

Tibet is united as one man behind the Dalai Lama who has taken over full powers. ... We have appealed to the world for peaceful intervention in (the face of this) clear case of unprovoked aggression.

The Tibetan Government also wrote to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 7 November 1950, appealing for the world body's intervention. The letter said, in part:

Tibet recognises that it is in no position to resist the Chinese advance. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government. ...Though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to war, we understand that the United Nations has decided to stop aggression wherever it takes place.

On 17 November 1950, El Salvador formally asked that the aggression against Tibet be put on the General Assembly agenda. However, the issue was not discussed in the UN General Assembly at the suggestion of the Indian delegation who asserted that a peaceful solution which is mutually advantageous to Tibet, India and China could be reached between the parties concerned. A second letter by the Tibetan delegation to the United Nations on 8 December 1950 did not change the situation. Faced with the military occupation of Eastern and Northern Tibet, the defeat and destruction of its small army, the advance of tens of thousands of more PLA troops into Central Tibet, and the lack of active support from the international community, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government decided to send a delegation to Beijing for negotiations with the new Chinese leadership.

"Seventeen-Point Agreement"
In April 1951, the Tibetan Government sent a five-member delegation to Beijing, led by Kalon Ngapo Ngawang Jigme. The Tibetan Government authorised its delegation to put forward the Tibetan stand and listen to the Chinese position. But, contrary to the claim made in the White Paper that the delegation had "full powers," it was expressly not given the plenipotentiary authority to conclude an agreement. In fact, it was instructed to refer all important matters to the Government. On 29 April negotiations opened with the presentation of a draft agreement by the leader of the Chinese delegation. The Tibetan delegation rejected the Chinese proposal in toto, after which the Chinese tabled a modified draft that was equally unacceptable to the Tibetan delegation. At this point, the Chinese delegates, Li Weihan and Zhang Jin-wu, made it plain that the terms, as they now stood, were final and amounted to an ultimatum. The Tibetan delegation was addressed in harsh and insulting terms, threatened with physical violence, and members were virtually kept prisoners. No further discussion was permitted, and, contrary to Chinese claims, the Tibetan delegation was prevented from contacting its Government for instructions. It was given the onerous choice of either signing the "Agreement" on its own authority or accepting responsibility for an immediate military advance on Lhasa. Under immense Chinese pressure the Tibetan delegation signed the "Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" on 23 May 1951, without being able to inform the Tibetan Government. The delegation warned the Chinese that they were signing only in their personal capacity and had no authority to bind either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government to the "Agreement". None of this posed an obstacle to the Chinese Government to proceed with a signing ceremony and to announce to the world that an "agreement" had been concluded for the "peaceful liberation of Tibet". Even the seals affixed to the document were forged by the Chinese Government to give it the necessary semblance of authenticity. The seventeen clauses of the "Agreement", among other things, authorised the entry into Tibet of Chinese forces and empowered the Chinese Government to handle Tibet's external affairs. On the other hand, it guaranteed that China would not alter the existing political system in Tibet and not interfere with the established status, function, and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. The Tibetan people were to have regional autonomy, and their religious beliefs and customs were to be respected. Internal reforms in Tibet would be effected after consultation with leading Tibetans and without compulsion. The full text of what came to be known as the "Seventeen-Point Agreement" was broadcast by Radio Beijing on 27 May 1951. This was the first time the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government heard of the devastating document. The reaction in Dromo (where the Dalai Lama was staying at that time) and Lhasa was one of shock and disbelief. A message was immediately sent to the delegation in Beijing, reprimanding them for signing the "Agreement" without consulting the Government for instructions. The delegation was asked to send the text of the document they had signed, and wait in Beijing for further instructions. In the meantime, a telegraphic message was received from the delegation to say that the Chinese Government representative, General Zhang Jin-wu, was already on his way to Dromo, via India. It added that some of the delegation members were returning, via India, and the leader of the delegation was returning directly to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government withheld the public repudiation of the "Agreement". The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951 in the hope of re-negotiating a more favourable treaty with the Chinese. On 9 September 1951, around 3,000 Chinese troops marched into Lhasa, soon followed by some 20,000 more, from eastern Tibet and from Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) in the north. The PLA occupied the principal cities of Ruthok and Gartok, and then Gyangtse and Shigatse. With the occupation of all the major cities of Tibet, including Lhasa, and large concentration of troops throughout eastern and western Tibet, the military control of Tibet was virtually complete. From this position, China refused to re-open negotiations and the Dalai Lama had effectively lost the ability to either accept or reject any Tibet-China agreement. However, on the first occasion he had of expressing himself freely again, which came only on 20 June 1959, after his flight to India, the Dalai Lama formally repudiated the "Seventeen-Point Agreement", as having been "thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms". In assessing the "17-Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" and the occupation of Tibet two factors are crucial. First, the extent to which China was violating international law when the PLA marched into Tibet, and second, the effect of the signing of the "Agreement". The law governing treaties is based on the universally recognised principle that the foundation of conventional obligations is the free and mutual consent of contracting parties and, conversely, that freedom of consent is essential to the validity of an agreement. Treaties brought about by the threat or the use of force lack legal validity, particularly if the coercion is applied to the country and government in question rather than only on the negotiators themselves. With China occupying large portions of Tibet and openly threatening a full military advance to Lhasa unless the treaty was signed, the "agreement" was invalid ab initio, meaning that it could not even be validated by a later act of acquiescence by the Tibetan Government. Contrary to China's claim in its White Paper, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government did not act voluntarily in signing the "Agreement". In fact, Mao Zedong himself, in the Directive of Central Committee of CPC on the Policies for our Work in Tibet, issued on 6 April 1952, admitted:

(N)ot only the two Silons (i.e., prime ministers) but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. ... As yet we do not have a material base for fully implementing the agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum. [Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Vol. 5, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1977, p.75]

[Vajradhara]

National Uprising


Introduction
When people are oppressed, they are likely to rise up against the oppressor. There was never a popular uprising in Tibet until the 1950s. Tibetan resistance movement against the Chinese started right from the time of invasion. By 1956 open fighting broke out in the Eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo. Three years later the uprising took on national proportions, leading to the massive demonstrations in Lhasa in March 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama and some 80,000 refugees to neighbouring countries. Tens of thousands of Tibetans were slaughtered by the PLA. Since then, Tibetan uprising and demonstrations have continued. Between 1987 and 1992 alone, there had been over 150 demonstrations in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet, some small but others very large. The Chinese troops suppressed most of these demonstrations with brutal force. In March 1989 Tibet was put under Martial Law for the second time in its history: the first time was in 1959.
The Chinese Government tries to depict the popular resistance of Tibetans as the work of a few disgruntled aristocrats who wish to restore the old system of exploitation and oppression of the Tibetan masses. It depicts 95 per cent of the Tibetans as having been serfs, brutally oppressed by a small number of aristocrats and lamas. What China cannot explain is why these allegedly oppressed masses never rose up against their masters, despite the fact that Tibet did not have a national police force and for most of its history had no strong army. Yet, these same Tibetans did rise up, and still do today, against the massive security apparatus and army of China, knowing the tremendous risk they take. If we look at the social composition of the Tibetans involved in the successive uprisings and demonstrations, more than 80 per cent of them are not aristocrats and high lamas. Furthermore, more than 85 per cent of Tibetans in exile belong to what the Chinese would call "serf class".

Events leading up to the 1959 National Uprising
Let us look briefly at the main causes of the Tibetan people's uprising against China in 1959. Following the entry of Chinese troops into Lhasa, every effort was made to undermine the sovereign authority of the Tibetan Government and impose Chinese authority. This was carried out in three ways: First, political and regional divisions were created among Tibetans under the policy of divide and rule. Secondly, certain social and economic reforms, calculated to change the fabric of Tibetan society, were instituted against the wishes of Tibetans. Thirdly, various organs of the Chinese Government, and new bodies under their authority, were set up alongside the existing Tibetan institutions.

Between 24 November 1950 and 19 October 1953, China incorporated a large portion of Kham province into neighbouring Chinese Sichuan province. Kham was divided into two so-called Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and one Tibetan Autonomous District. On 13 September 1957, another portion of southern Kham was named the Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and put under Yunnan Province. The bulk of Amdo, together with a small area of Kham, was reduced to the status of a Chinese province, and named as Qinghai. One portion of Amdo was named Ngapa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and merged with Sichuan Province. The remaining area of Amdo was sub-divided into Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous District (6 May 1950), and Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1 October 1953), and incorporated into the Chinese province of Gansu. On 9 September 1965, China formally established the so-called Tibet Autonomous Regional government, placing under its administration the whole of U-Tsang and parts of Kham area. China stripped numerous ethnic Tibetans like the Sherpas, Monpas, Lhopas, Tengpas, Jangpas, etc, who consider themselves to be Tibetan, of their Tibetan identity, classifying them as distinct Chinese minorities.

The appropriation by the People's Liberation Army of thousands of tons of barley and other foodstuffs pushed the Tibetans to the brink of famine for the first time in history and prompted protest meetings in Lhasa. The first major popular resistance group, the Mimang Tsongdu (People's Assembly), banded together spontaneously and handed the Chinese Military Command a petition demanding withdrawal of the PLA and an end to Chinese interference in Tibetan affairs. The Chinese reaction was swift: the two Tibetan Prime Ministers, Lukhangwa and Ven. Lobsang Tashi, who had made no secret of their opposition to Chinese rule and opposed the "17-Point Agreement", were forced to resign and five Mimang Tsongdu leaders were jailed, driving the organisation underground.

In 1954, the the Dalai Lama visited Beijing on China's invitation. The "special" autonomous position of Tibet, embodied in the "Seventeen-Point Agreement," was formally abolished with the adoption of the new Constitution by the Chinese People's Congress. This was followed by the adoption of the "Resolution on the Establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART)", a measure designed to further integrate the administration of Tibet into that of PRC. The Preparatory Committee was to function as the central administration of Tibet instead of the Tibetan Government. The Dalai Lama was made its Chairman, but without any authority. As the Dalai Lama explained in his autobiography:

The Committee was powerless - a mere facade of Tibetan representation behind which all the effective power was exercised by the Chinese. In fact, all basic policy was decided by another body called the Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, which had no Tibetan members. [Dalai Lama, Ibid, p.133]

In 1956, PCART was set up and the Tashilhunpo estate, and those regions under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Chamdo (a Tibetan Government appointee) in Eastern Tibet, were separated from the jurisdiction of the Tibetan Government in Lhasa and their administrative organs given equal status as the Tibetan Government, thereby reducing the authority of the Tibetan Government.
Social, political, and agrarian reforms were imposed by the Chinese Government in Amdo and Kham and, to a much lesser degree, in the rest of the country. Frequent attacks were launched on religious personages and monasteries. All of these led to increasingly violent reactions. The "17-Point Agreement" guaranteed that no reforms would be forced on the Tibetans. But in Eastern Tibet they were introduced and enforced at once. Mounting impatience and belligerence of the Chinese administrators provoked violent reactions and rapidly culminated into armed conflicts in a widening spiral of resistance and military repression that engulfed the entire eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo. As the violence spilled over to other areas of Tibet, a full- scale guerrilla warfare broke out in the summer of 1956. Refugees from eastern and northeastern Tibet began to arrive in Lhasa in large numbers. Within a year, the uprising had spread to Central Tibet, and in 1958 Tensung Dhanglang Magar, (the Voluntary Force for the Defense of the Faith), a union of the Mimang Tsongdu and Chushi Gangduk (Four Rivers Six Ranges) organisations, was founded. By the autumn of that year this popular army, estimated at 80,000 men, was in control of most districts of Southern Tibet and parts of Eastern Tibet. The Dalai Lama took pains to calm his people so as to prevent worse bloodbath. Nevertheless, the situation in Tibet deteriorated rapidly while the Dalai Lama visited India, in 1956, to take part in the Buddha Jayanti celebration at the invitation of independent India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. In meetings with Nehru and Zhou Enlai in Delhi, the Dalai Lama expressed his deep concern at the explosive situation in his homeland and admitted he was contemplating seeking political asylum in India. Nehru advised the Dalai Lama against it. To induce the Dalai Lama to return home, the Chinese Government promptly announced that the "socialist and democratic reforms" would be postponed in Tibet for the time being. It was also agreed that a number of Chinese civil personnel would be withdrawn, and the PCART's departments would be reduced by half. This turned out to be a false promise. In the years that followed, the Chinese intensified socialist campaigns and purges against Tibetans and sent considerable army reinforcements to Tibet, thus more than offsetting the earlier modest reduction of Chinese cadres.

National Uprising and flight of the Dalai Lama
The inevitable showdown occurred in March 1959. There was general fear that the Chinese were planning to abduct the Dalai Lama and take him away to Beijing. The Tibetan people already had bitter experiences in Kham and Amdo, where important lamas and local leaders disappeared mysteriously after being invited to Chinese cultural shows and other functions. Fears for the safety of the Dalai Lama became acute when the Chinese Army Command invited the Tibetan leader to a theatrical show in the military barracks on 10 March. Tibetans became even more suspicious when the Chinese instructed that the Dalai Lama be not accompanied by bodyguards as was the tradition. The people in Lhasa would not allow the Dalai Lama to give in to the Chinese subterfuge. On 10 March 1959, a massive demonstration was held and thousands of people surrounded the Dalai Lama's Summer Palace, the Norbulingkha, to prevent the Dalai Lama from attending the Chinese show. For the next few days, mass meetings were held in Lhasa with the citizens demanding that the Chinese quit Tibet and restore the country's full independence. The Dalai Lama, fearing the explosive consequences of these mass demonstrations, urged the large crowd before the Norbulingkha to disperse and wrote three letters to the principal Chinese General, Tian Guan-san, in an effort to placate the Chinese and stave off impending violence. Explaining the circumstances in which he wrote these letters, the Dalai Lama says in his autobiography:

I replied to all his letters to gain time - time for anger to cool on both sides and time for me to urge moderation of the Lhasa people... my most urgent moral duty at that moment was to prevent a totally disastrous clash between my unarmed people and the Chinese army. [Dalai Lama, Ibid, p.187]

But, despite the Dalai Lama's efforts, open fighting broke out in Lhasa soon afterwards, with disastrous consequences to the Tibetans.
Seeing that all efforts to prevent open confrontation and bloodshed had ultimately failed, and that cooperation with the Chinese authorities to minimise their oppression was no longer possible, the Dalai Lama decided to escape to India to appeal for international help to save his people. He left Lhasa on the night of 17 March. On 28 March 1959, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai issued an Order of State Council "dissolving" the Government of Tibet. The Dalai Lama and his ministers, while still en route to India, reacted promptly by declaring that the new administration installed in Lhasa, which was totally controlled by the Chinese, would never be recognised by the people of Tibet. Upon his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama re-established the Tibetan Government in exile and publicly declared, "Wherever I am, accompanied by my government, the Tibetan people recognise us as the Government of Tibet." Within months, around 80,000 Tibetans reached the borders of India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim after arduous escapes. Many more could not even make it to the border. China's White Paper tries to portray these events as the work of a handful of Tibetan reactionaries who, with the help of the CIA, created an armed "rebellion" which was "resolutely" opposed by the masses. The Dalai Lama was "carried away under duress" to India, the White Paper states. The resistance, they claim, amounted to no more than 7,000 "rebels," and was put down easily in two days. This view is hardly credible and has been contradicted even by the Chinese authorities themselves. Chinese army intelligence reports admit that the PLA killed 87,000 members of the Tibetan resistance in Lhasa and surrounding areas between March and October 1959 alone. [Xizang Xingshi he Renwu Jiaoyu de Jiben Jiaocai, PLA Military District's Political Report, 1960] The CIA's half-hearted assistance to the Tibetan resistance started in earnest only after the uprising, and, though welcomed by Tibetans, amounted to little. All the evidence shows that the uprising was massive, popular and widespread. The brutal repression which followed in all regions of Tibet only confirms this.

[Vajradhara]

Introduction

Over 1.2 million Tibetans have died as a direct result of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet. Today, it is hard to come across a Tibetan family that has not had at least one member imprisoned or killed by the Chinese regime. According to Jigme Ngabo, "after the suppressions of 1959 and 1969, almost every family in Tibet has been affected in some way". These facts speak volumes about the "democratic reform" China claims to have brought to the "dark, feudal exploitative society" of Tibet.

Independent Tibet was certainly not an embodiment of perfect human society. But it was, by no means, nearly as tyrannical as it is today under Chinese rule. Its two biggest prisons, located in Lhasa, had, at any one time, no more than 30 inmates each. But, following Chinese invasion the whole of Tibet has been turned into a vast network of prisons and labour camps. There are reports that China even resorted to massacre of prisoners to keep the prison population within manageable limits.

However, China continues to claim that since its "liberation", the people of Tibet have enjoyed wide measures of liberty and freedom. Let us examine the facts.

1949-1979: Killings and destructions
According to one Chinese source, the PLA "exterminated" more than 5,700 Tibetan "soldiers", and imprisoned more than 2,000 in different areas of eastern Tibet between 7 and 25 October, 1950. [A Survey of Tibet Autonomous Region, Tibet People's Publishing House, 1984]
Accounts of massacres, tortures and killings, bombardment of monasteries, extermination of whole nomad camps are well documented. Quite a number of these reports have been also documented by the International Commission of Jurists' 1960 report on Tibet.

According to a secret Chinese military document, the PLA crushed 996 rebellions in Kanlho, Amdo, over the period 1952-58, killing over 10,000 Tibetans. [Work Report of the 11th PLA Division, 1952-1958] Similarly, the population of another Amdo area of Golok had its population reduced from about 130,000 in 1956 to about 60,000 in 1963.[China Spring, June 1986] Speaking about the same area, the Panchen Lama said:

If there was a film made on all the atrocities perpetrated in Qinghai Province, it would shock the viewers. In Golok area, many people were killed and their dead bodies rolled down the hill into a big ditch. The soldiers told the family members and relatives of the dead people that they should celebrate since the rebels have been wiped out. They were even forced to dance on the dead bodies. Soon after, they were also massacred with machine guns. [Speech by the Panchen Lama at a meeting of the Sub-Committee of the National People's Congress in Peking on situation in Tibet, 28 March 1987]

The Panchen Lama specifically pointed out:

In Amdo and Kham, people were subjected to unspeakable atrocities. People were shot in groups of ten or twenty. ... Such actions have left deep wounds in the minds of the people.

In a crackdown operation launched in the wake of the National Uprising of 10 March 1959 in Lhasa, 10,000 to 15,000 Tibetans were killed within three days. According to a secret 1960 PLA Tibet Military District Political Department report, between March 1959 and October 1960, 87,000 Tibetans were killed in Central Tibet alone. [Xizang Xingshi he Renwu Jiaoyu de Jiben Jiaocai, 1960] According to information compiled by the Tibetan Administration in exile, over 1.2 million Tibetans died between 1949 and 1979.

In a crackdown operation launched in the wake of the National Uprising of 10 March 1959 in Lhasa, 10,000 to 15,000 Tibetans were killed within three days. According to a secret 1960 PLA Tibet Military District Political Department report, between March 1959 and October 1960, 87,000 Tibetans were killed in Central Tibet alone. [Xizang Xingshi he Renwu Jiaoyu de Jiben Jiaocai, 1960] According to information compiled by the Tibetan Administration in exile, over 1.2 million Tibetans died between 1949 and 1979.


MODE OF DEATH U-TSANG KHAM AMDO TOTAL
Tortured in prison 93,560 64,877 14,784 173,221
Executed 28,267 32,266 96,225 156,758
Killed in Fighting 143,253 240,410 49,042 432,705
Starved to death 131,072 89,916 121,982 342,970
Suicide 3,375 3,952 1,675 9,002
"Struggled" to death 27,951 48,840 15,940 92,731
Total:- 427,478 480,261 299,648 1,207,387

Deaths in prisons and labour and concentration camps
Compilation of figures based on testimonies of survivors of prisons and labour camps show that throughout Tibet about 70 per cent of the inmates died. For example, in the wilderness of the northern Tibetan plains at Jhang Tsalakha more than 10,000 prisoners were kept in five prisons and forced to mine and transport borax. According to some of the survivors of these camps, every day 10 to 30 died from hunger, beating and overwork; in a year more than 8,000 had died. Likewise, in the construction of Lhasa Ngachen Hydro-electric Power Station, now falsely claimed to have been built by the PLA, everyday at least three or four dead prisoners were seen being thrown into the nearby river or burnt. To cite an example from eastern Tibet, from 1960 to 1962, 12,019 inmates died at a lead mine in Dartsedo district, according to a former inmate, Mrs. Adhi Tap* from Nyarong, Kham.

Human rights in Tibet today
The death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 resulted in a change in Chinese policies. The signal tune of that change was economic liberalisation and openness, and even some degree of leniency on political prisoners.

But liberalisation and openness, as it turned out, did not signal a change of attitude towards political freedom in Tibet. In May 1982, 115 Tibetan political activists were arrested and branded as "delinquents" and "black marketeers." More arrests and public executions followed. By the end of November 1983, 750 Tibetan political activists had been jailed in Lhasa alone.

On 27 September 1987, more than 200 Tibetans staged a demonstration in Lhasa. In the clamp down which followed on successive demonstrations - including the ones on 1 October 1987 and 5 March 1988 - Chinese police opened fire, killing and critically wounding many on the spot and imprisoning at least 2,500.

In July 1988, China's security chief, Qiao Shi, while on a tour of the "TAR" announced "merciless repression" of all forms of protest against Chinese rule in Tibet. [UPI, 20 July 1988]

The policy was implemented at once. The crackdown on the 10 December 1988 demonstration at Jokhang, the most sacred Tibetan shrine in Lhasa, was witnessed by a Dutch tourist, Christa Meindersma (26 at the time), who recalled: "... without any warning, the police opened fire, shooting quite indiscriminately into the crowd. They didn't seem to mind who they hit. ... as I turned to run I was shot in the shoulder." According to a western journalist who happened to be there, at least one officer was heard ordering his men to "kill the Tibetans". The toll on that day was at least 15 killed, over 150 seriously wounded, and many others arrested.

However, for three days from 5 March 1989 Lhasa was, once again, in turmoil, with demonstrators waving the Tibetan flag and shouting for independence. During the police crackdown, automatic weapons were fired even into some homes. Estimates of deaths varied from 80 to 400. The official Chinese figure was only 11. According to Tang Da-xian, a Chinese journalist who was in Lhasa at the time, some four hundred Tibetans were massacred, several thousand were injured and three thousand were imprisoned. [Events in Lhasa March 2nd-10th 1989, Tang Daxian, London, TIN, 15 June 1990] At midnight on 7 March 1989, martial law was formally imposed in Lhasa.

About a year later, on 1 May 1990, China announced the lifting of martial law. 1990. However, as pointed out by the first Australian Human Rights Delegation to China, which was permitted to visit Tibet in July 1991: "Though martial law had indeed been lifted on 1 May 1990, it continues to exist in all but name". Amnesty International (AI), in its 1991 report, also confirmed this, adding, "the police and security forces retained extensive powers of arbitrary arrest and detention without trial."

In the run up to China's celebration of the 40th anniversary of its annexation of Tibet, 146 "criminals" were arrested on 10 April 1991, and this was followed by more arrests announced at public sentencing rallies. On the day of the celebration the whole of Lhasa was put under curfew.

In a sudden clampdown, starting in February 1992, groups of ten Chinese personnel raided Tibetan houses in Lhasa and arrested anyone found in possession of anything deemed subversive; these included photographs, and tapes or books containing speeches or teachings of the Dalai Lama. Over 200 were arrested.

Despite all measures of repression, demonstrations continued throughout Tibet after 1987. Available reports confirm that between 27 September 1987 and end of 1992, there had been more than 150 demonstrations of various sizes throughout Tibet.

"Violation of human rights of concern to Amnesty International in Tibet include the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience and of other political prisoners after unfair trials, torture and ill- treatment of detainees, the use of the death penalty and extra judicial executions. Constitutional and legal provisions in Tibet restrict the exercise of basic freedoms and lack human rights safeguards consistent with international standards." [People's Republic of China: Amnesty International's Concerns in Tibet, AI, London, January 1992, ASA 17/02/92, summary page]

"All such manifestations (i.e., demonstrations and political dissent) of dissatisfaction with Chinese rule - whether peacefully conducted or otherwise - are viewed by the authorities as constituting `illegal separatist activity', and those who have led or participated in them have been punished with escalating force and severity. `Merciless repression' remains, in Tibet, the order of the day." [Merciless Repression: Human Rights in Tibet, Asia Watch, Washington, DC]

Human rights violation in Tibet is all pervasive. Available evidences suggest that China violates with impunity every norm of civilised conduct as laid down in international law books, many of which it has undertaken to observe by affirmative acts of ratification, such as the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), and customary laws of nations such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, disappearances and summary executions, Evidences of arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention often resulting in disappearances, and summary executions, are cited in the 1990 report of AI which pointed out that "over 1,000 people, including prisoners of conscience, were arrested after martial law was imposed in Lhasa in March" and that "some of them were summarily executed." It also pointed out that "evidences of persistent human rights violations in Tibet continued to come to light in 1989, including reports of numerous arbitrary arrests, long-term detention without charge or trial, and torture".

Under Chinese rule in Tibet, there is no question of informing prisoners of the grounds for their arrest and their right to legal remedies. Arrest warrants are rarely issued or produced.

Grounds for arrest and imprisonment seem to be found in any kind of activity: Tibetans have been arrested for speaking with foreigners, or singing patriotic songs, or putting up wall posters, or possessing copies of an autobiography of the Dalai Lama or some video or audio cassette on him, or for preparing a list of casualties during Chinese crackdown on demonstrations, or for "plotting" and advising friends to wear the traditional Tibetan costume on Chinese national day. Incommunicado detention is almost routine. Often it is left to the device of the relatives of the arrested person to locate him or her. [Defying the Dragon: China and Human Rights in Tibet, LAWASIA and TIN, London, March 1991, p. 33]

A person taken into custody is declared arrested only after a period ranging from several days to months, or even years. During the period of the initial detention there is no question of informing the family since he is "legally" not arrested.

[Vajradhara]

Torture

In Tibet, torture is the only known and expected method of interrogating prisoners. China's signing of the Convention Against Torture on 12 December 1986, and its supposed coming into force at the end of 1988, did not alter the trend.

Methods and instruments of torture and ill-treatment have been described by a number of former prisoners who had been subjected to them. These include indiscriminate beating with anything available on hand such as electric batons, kicking, punching, hitting with rifle-butt, stick, and even iron bar. In prison, cruel and degrading methods of torture for the purpose of extracting confessions have been reported. These include setting of guard dogs on prisoners, use of electric batons especially on women prisoners in extremely perverted and degrading manners, inflicting cigarette burns, administration of electric shock, etc. One recent refugee from eastern Tibet, who was a member of the Chinese Public Security Bureau, described thirty-three methods of torture of prisoners. New methods of torture are being constantly devised and this has been acknowledged in at least one internal party document in Tibet. ["To Control Others, First Control Yourself", H'o Phan in TAR Internal Party Study Document, in Tibetan, issue No. 2, September 1989, p. 21 ff.]

Lack of due process

In the Chinese legal system the most basic safeguard - the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt - does not exist.

Sentences imposed on political prisoners are often atrociously high in comparison to the degree of the alleged offence. Prisoners are often detained for an extended period without charges and are seldom brought before a court of law.

Administrative detention is imposed by police or local authorities without supervision by an independent judiciary. The police have wide powers to impose periods of administrative detention varying from a few days to several years without any judicial review. Though China's Administrative Procedure Act provides for a right to appeal, it is made practically impossible to use it.

There is no right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, or the right to be tried in an open court. Defence argument, when permitted, is restricted to appeal for mitigation of punishment, not for pleading innocence. The role of the judges are restricted to passing sentences determined by the political authorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that Tibetans refer to the judges only as sentencing officers.

Freedom of movement

In flagrant violation of Article 13 of UDHR, China has imposed a series of rules restricting free movement of Tibetans within their own country. People have to be registered at a particular place where alone they are entitled to reside and buy food ration. Going from one place to another for any purpose, even for a short duration, requires official permission. There had been many occasions when Tibetans have been expelled from Lhasa to their native villages. It occurred when China was preparing to celebrate the 40th anniversary of annexation of Tibet on 23 May 1991. Following the crackdown on the demonstrations of 5-7 March 1989, 40,000 Tibetans were expelled from Lhasa to their native villages. In August 1992, the Chinese authorities expelled around 6,000 Tibetans, homeless as well as pilgrims, from the ground behind eastern Lhasa's hospital. The ground is now occupied by Chinese office buildings and shops.

International attention on human rights violations

China claims that its PLA entered Tibet to "liberate" it stands starkly exposed by the 1960 report of the International Commission of Jurists on Tibet. The report states that China committed systematic violations of human rights in Tibet, including acts of genocide [see 1960 ICJ Report]. Three UN Resolutions in 1959 [UNGA Res. 1353 (XIV)], 1961 [UNGA Res. 1723 (XVI)] and 1965 [UNGA Res. 2079 (XX)], calling on China to respect the human rights of Tibetans, including their right to self-determination, reinforced the findings of the Commission.

Government and parliamentary supports

More recently, a number of countries passed parliamentary resolutions on Tibet calling on the Chinese Government to respect the human rights of the Tibetan people. Among them are the European Parliament (14 October 1987, 15 March 1989 and 25-26 April 1990), West Germany (15 October 1987), Italy (12 April 1989), Australia (6 December 1990), 6 June 1991), etc. The United States' Senate and the House of Representatives together passed more than 10 resolutions calling on China to respect the political and human rights of the Tibetan people. On 28 October 1991, the US President, George Bush, signed into law a Congressional Resolution declaring Tibet "an Occupied country under established principles of international law, whose true representatives were the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government as recognized by the Tibetan people". Similarly, many Governments expressed their concern directly to the Chinese Government.

Concerns at the situation in occupied-Tibet was also raised by parliamentarian support groups of various countries, such as India (27 April 1989), Austria (24 May 1989), Australia (9 March 1989), Switzerland (16 March 1989), etc.

Tibet at the UNO in recent years
In 1985 the human rights situation in Tibet was, once again, discussed at the United Nations. Various non-governmental organisations called on the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to address the human rights situation in Tibet. Since then, Tibet figured prominently at various human rights fora of the UNO and at almost all the succeeding sessions of the UNCHR and its sub-commissions.

At the 46 sessions of the UNCHR in February 1990, Governments, including those of the EC, the US, Canada, Sweden and Australia addressed the issue of Tibet. Statements on discrimination, self-determination and on martial law by NGOs were also published by the UN.

Various other committees and organs of the UNO and sub-committees held detailed hearings on the human rights situations in Tibet and evasive Chinese responses were consistently criticised. These included the fourth session of the Committe Against Torture in April 1990 and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
On 23 August 1991, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed the "Situation in Tibet" Resolution (1991/10), expressing concern at "continuing reports of violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms which threatened the distinct cultural, religious and national identity of the Tibetan people".

Ironically this seems to confirm Mao's dictum that a just cause always receives many supporters.

Myth of Tibetan self-rule
In its White Paper, China claims that under the "democratic reform in 1959" it "introduced the new political system of people's democracy"; and that the Tibetan people "have become masters of the country". Nothing could be further from the truth. Though the "TAR" is claimed to be "autonomous", Tibetans have little or no say in running their own affairs. Final decision-making power has always been held by the Chinese Communist Party through its "TAR Regional" Party's First Secretary who has always been a Chinese: In 1959, it was Zhang Guhua; he was followed successively by Tseng Yun Ya, Ren Rong, Yin Fatang, Wu Jinhua, Hu Jintao and Chen Kuiyuan.

Even the highest Tibetan officials, like Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, cannot make any decisions without consent of their Chinese "subordinates". They are not even allowed to stay in Tibet: visits are made only to fulfil Chinese Government needs and purposes. Such restrictions were especially applied to the movement of the late Panchen Lama.
At all so-called democratic meetings, pre-determined proposals of the concerned Chinese Communist Party body are tabled only to be praised and approved by show of hands. Making criticisms, amendments or alternative suggestions are impermissible profanities. The pre-determined outcome of such a meeting is then declared to be "democratic decision of the people".

Whatever may be the position a Tibetan occupies in the Chinese hierarchy in Tibet, he always has a "junior" Chinese official "under" him who exercises the real power. In most important offices, such as the so called "TAR" Economic Planning Department and the Personnel Department, Chinese officials and clerical staff far outnumber Tibetans.
As regards the so-called elected deputies of the people, all candidates are pre-determined by the concerned Chinese leaders. After the voting the winners are again chosen by the same authorities who had selected the candidates.

And the population of about a half of Tibet, merged into neighbouring Chinese provinces, have been completely deprived of their political identity and rendered an insignificant minority of electorates in their own land.

[Vajradhara]

Quest for solution


From 1959 until 1979 the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the Chinese Government had no contact. However, throughout this period the Dalai Lama retained his hope of finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Tibet through contact and dialogue with the Chinese Government. Soon after coming to India, the Dalai Lama issued a press statement in Mussoorie on 20 June 1959, wherein he said:

Although recent actions and policies of the Chinese authorities in Tibet have created strong feelings of bitterness and resentment against the Government of China, we, Tibetans, lay and monk alike, do not cherish any feelings of enmity and hatred against the great Chinese people. ... We must also insist on the creation of a favourable climate by the immediate adoption of the essential measures as a condition precedent to negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

In the light of political changes in China, the Dalai Lama, in his 10 March statement to the Tibetan people in 1978, said:

(T)he Chinese should allow the Tibetans in Tibet to visit their parents and relatives now in exile. ...Similar opportunity should be given to the Tibetans in exile. Under such an arrangement we can be confident of knowing the true situation inside Tibet.

Toward the end of 1978, Mr Gyalo Thondup (one of the elder brothers of the Dalai Lama) was contacted by Mr Li Juisin, director of Xinhua News Agency, in Hong Kong, through a common friend. A meeting was arranged in January 1979 during which Mr Li extended Mr Deng Xiaoping's invitation to Mr Thondup to visit Beijing to discuss the Tibet problem. With the approval of the Dalai Lama, Mr Thondup made a private visit to Beijing in late February 1979. Mr Thondup met with leading Chinese officials in Beijing. They told him that under the "Gang of Four" China had suffered great instability, affecting its development in the fields of industry and agriculture. Tibet also suffered as a result of this, they said, and added that the 1959 uprising in Tibet was inspired by a number of factors for which the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people could not be blamed. Mr Deng Xiaoping said during his meeting with Mr Thondup that as it is better to see things once with one's own eyes than to hear a hundred times, he would invite exile Tibetans of all ages to visit Tibet and see the actual situation for themselves. Mr Deng went on to say that China was willing to discuss and resolve with Tibetans all issues other than complete independence of Tibet. The Dalai Lama and his Government responded by sending three fact-finding delegations to Tibet in 1979 and 1980. The fourth delegation, consisting of 16 members representing various Tibetan Buddhist schools and people from other walks of life, was also arranged. However, on 6 August 1980, China expressed its inability to receive this delegation on the ground that it would not be able to accord the delegates proper reception as "the weather in Tibet was going to be cold, and also because some development work was in progress". So, this visit did not come through. After repeated reminders to the Chinese Government of Deng Xiaoping's invitation, the fourth delegation, led by former Kalon W.G. Kundeling, was allowed to visit only north-eastern part of Tibet in July 1985. At the end of the visit, the delegation told the Chinese government about the problems they observed in Tibet and asked them to rectify them. Since then, no delegation has been allowed to visit Tibet. However, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government continued to make sincere efforts to develop closer contact and better understanding with the Chinese Government. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government took several confidence-building steps and other initiatives. On 21 July 1980, it was suggested that travel restrictions on Tibetans wishing to visit their relatives in and outside Tibet should be eased. This was rejected. The background of Tibetans wishing to visit their relatives outside Tibet are thoroughly scrutinised, and in most cases, they are also required to leave members of their families behind as hostages. Similarly, exile Tibetans wishing to visit Tibet are required to take Chinese- issued travel documents describing them as "Overseas Chinese". In September 1980, the Exile Government offered to send about 50 trained Tibetan teachers to help in Tibet. In response, China first parried the matter by stating that since these Tibetan youths were brought up and educated in India with good facilities, they would face difficulties in adjusting to the poor living conditions in Tibet. Instead, they proposed that the teachers should first be sent to teach in several Nationalities Schools within China. The Exile Tibetan Government replied that the Tibetan volunteers were fully aware of the poor facilities in Tibet. Left with no valid reasons to deny permission, the Chinese Government put forward unacceptable pre-conditions by suggesting that the Tibetan teachers must first accept Chinese nationality. Around the same time the Tibetan suggestion to open a liaison office in Beijing to foster closer contacts was also turned down. On 14 December 1980, the Government-in-Exile asked the Chinese authorities to allow 11 Tibetan scholars, living in Tibet, to attend a conference of Tibetologists. This met with an outright rejection. On 13 March 1981, the Dalai Lama wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, in which, amongst other things, he stated:

The time has come to apply our common wisdom in a spirit of tolerance and broad-mindedness to achieve genuine happiness for the Tibetan people with renewed urgency. On my part, I remain committed to contribute to the welfare of all human beings and, in particular, the poor and weak, to the best of my ability, without making any discrimination based on nationalities. I hope you will let me know your views on the foregoing points.

There was no reply to this letter. Instead, on 28 July 1981, General Secretary Hu Yaobang gave Mr Gyalo Thondup a document, entitled "Five-point Policy Towards the Dalai Lama", which reduced the issue to that of the personal status of the Dalai Lama. Since the real issue is the future well-being of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama, in April 1982, sent a three-member high-level delegation to Beijing to have exploratory talks with the Chinese leadership. This delegation put forward a number of broad proposals for the consideration of the Chinese leaders. In February 1983, the Dalai Lama expressed his desire to visit Tibet around 1985. In the meantime, under the so-called Anti-pollution Campaign, a new phase of political repression was unleashed in Tibet, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of a number of persons. In October 1984, another three-member high-level delegation was sent to Beijing to ask the Chinese Government to end its latest political repression in Tibet, discuss arrangements for the possible visit of the Dalai Lama, and to explore possibilities for further talks. The Chinese responses to all these overtures were negative. Contrary to the understanding of keeping these bi- lateral discussions confidential, the Chinese Government chose to make its rejection public through its media. It is clear from the above facts that the Dalai Lama and his Government did try to initiate meaningful direct, bi-lateral dialogues with the Chinese Government. When all these attempts failed the Dalai Lama was left with no alternative, but to make his position public and appeal for international support. Addressing the United States Congress' Human Rights Caucus on 21 September 1987, the Dalai Lama proposed a Five-Point Peace Plan. The five points are:

Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people; Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Rejecting this proposal on 17 October 1987, the Chinese leadership accused the Dalai Lama of widening the gulf between him and their Government. Despite the rude response, the Dalai Lama made an earnest effort to clarify the Tibetan position in a detailed 14-point note, conveyed to the Chinese Government on 17 December 1987. On 15 June 1988, at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama made another detailed proposal, which elaborated the last point of the Five-point Peace Plan for negotiations. An advance copy of the text of this speech was given to the Chinese Government through its Embassy in New Delhi. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama's Representative in New Delhi met the Chinese Charg* d'Affaires in New Delhi on 22 and 29 August to clarify some of the misgivings the Chinese Government had raised through various press statements. Amongst other things, the Representative emphasised that the Strasbourg proposal was very much within the context of Deng Xiaoping's statement to Gyalo Thondup in 1979, when he said that everything, except the question of complete independence, could be discussed. In the Strasbourg proposal, the Dalai Lama had put forward the notion of association rather than separation. On 21 September 1988, the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi informed a senior official of the Dalai Lama that its Government was willing to have talks with the representative of the Dalai Lama at the venue and time of the latter's choice. Welcoming the Chinese announcement, the Kashag, on 23 September 1988, said: "We hope this positive response to our suggestion is an indication that the Chinese sincerely wish to deal with the issue this time." On 25 October 1988, the Chinese Government was informed through its New Delhi Embassy that the venue for talks should be Geneva which is the most convenient and neutral place and that the talks should begin in January 1989. In early November 1988, Mr Yang Min-fu, head of the United Front, told Mr Gyalo Thondup that although they differed in thinking over some points of the Strasbourg proposal, these could be discussed and resolved. However, on 18 November 1988, the Chinese Government, through its New Delhi Embassy, put forward the following pre-conditions for the talks:

The Chinese Government disapprove of the way the venue and date for the proposed talks were publicly announced. The most suitable venue for talks is Beijing. The six-member negotiating team appointed by the Dalai Lama is not acceptable as all of them have always engaged in splittist activities. Neither is the Dutch lawyer acceptable as this talk deals with internal matters only. The Chinese Government would like to have direct talks with the Dalai Lama. However, it is also willing to accept a trusted representative of the Dalai Lama, like Gyalo Thondup. The Strasbourg proposal cannot be the basis for talks. The pre-conditions for holding the talks is to accept and support the unity of the "Motherland".

The Tibetan Government was naturally disappointed by this communication as it was inconsistent with the earlier public statements and official communications received from the Chinese Government. On 5 December 1988, the Tibetan Government responded to the Chinese communication and said:

Since the Chinese Government left the choice of venue and date for talks to the Dalai Lama, he responded in good faith by proposing Geneva as the venue and January 1989 as the date for starting the negotiations. On numerous occasions, the Chinese Government stated publicly as well as through messages conveyed to the Tibetan Government that it was willing to meet and negotiate with any persons appointed by the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government, therefore, fails to understand the Chinese refusal to accept the delegation appointed by the DalaiLama. It should be the prerogative of the Dalai Lama to appoint whomsoever he chooses to negotiate on his behalf. Dr Michael van Walt van Praag is not a member of the negotiating team. He is only a legal advisor. As suggested by the Chinese Government, Mr Gyalo Thondup will be associated with the talks as an advisor of the Tibetan team. Fair and meaningful negotiations on the future of Tibet can only take place without the imposition of pre-conditions by either side. The proposals contained in the Strasbourg statement provide the most reasonable and realistic basis for such discussions.

[Vajradhara]

In February 1989, when the Panchen Lama passed away in Tibet, the Dalai Lama proposed to send a ten-member Tibetan religious delegation to Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse and other areas in Tibet, such as Lhasa, Kubum and Tashi-kyil, for the purpose of offering prayers and performing kalachakra ceremony for the late Panchen Lama. China rejected the request and stated that there was no precedence for prayers of this scale and that it could not accept two leaders of the delegation who, they said, were officials of the Kashag. The Tibetan Government agreed to withdraw them and approached the Chinese Government, once again. On 17 March 1989, the reply came through the Chinese Embassy. China agreed to receive only two or three lamas as representatives of the Dalai Lama. But the lamas must go only to Tashilhunpo, that too via Beijing, and must return to India immediately after offering the prayers. In the same message, the Chinese Government accused the Tibetan Government-in-Exile of having plotted the "troubles" in Lhasa, and criticised the Dalai Lama for appealing to world leaders for help in getting the martial law in Tibet lifted. On 23 March 1989 the Tibetan Government gave the following reply to the Chinese Embassy:

Refusal to allow the proposed religious delegation to visit Tibet to make religious offerings and perform a special Kalachakra Prayer Ceremony for the late Panchen Rinpoche, even after we agreed to make some changes in the members of the delegation and explained the requirement of the minimum number of monks we had suggested for performing the Kalachakra Prayer Ceremony, is yet another disappointing experience for us. Obviously there is no point in sending two or three monks. We wish to deny categorically, once again, the allegation that we were behind the recent troubles in Tibet and that we are engaging in some kind of terrorist activities by smuggling into Tibet trained persons and arms. We would like the Government to produce substantive evidence to support these serious allegations and also allow an independent international commission to visit Tibet to determine the real causes of the trouble in Tibet. It is within the right of any person to appeal for help when faced with a desperate situation. In order to avoid further bloodshed and repression, His Holiness the Dalai Lama appealed to various world leaders, including Chairman Deng Xiaoping. His Holiness' consistent effort for direct dialogue and peaceful resolution of the problem is well known. We, once again, urge the Government of the PRC to commence the proposed negotiations soon. Any attempt to delay it on one excuse or the other will not be helpful. His Holiness made the proposal last June and suggested the commencement of the talks in January this year. Since December 5, 1988 we had both in writing and messages through the Embassy in New Delhi conveyed our sincere clarifications to the doubts and objections raised by your Government. The latest accusation against us for spoiling the atmosphere and blaming us for the delay in starting talks is unfair. Judging by our experience so far, we feel that the Government of the PRC still has not given up its authoritarian attitude and bullying tactics. If this continues there will be the need of the presence of a third party in our proposed negotiations to ensure that there are no further accusations and intimidations.

Even after the imposition of martial law in Tibet, the Dalai Lama offered to send some representatives to Hong Kong to have preparatory meetings with the representatives of the Chinese Government. In order to create a conducive atmosphere for dialogues, the Dalai Lama requested an early withdrawal of the martial law. In a reply, received through the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on 17 May 1989, the Chinese Government justified the imposition of the martial law "to deal with a handful of criminals indulging in beating, robbery and banditry", and stated that appealing for its withdrawal was tantamount to supporting the "criminals". The reply further stated that the Dalai Lama's proposal for turning the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace would never be accepted by the Chinese Government. It did not say anything about the Tibetan proposal for preliminary talks in Hong Kong. The Dalai Lama waited for two years for a positive response from the Chinese side to his proposal for negotiations. Then, in 1991, during his 10 March Speech, the Dalai Lama warned that unless the Chinese Government responded positively to his proposal without further delays, he would consider himself free from any obligations to abide by the concessions he had made in the Strasbourg proposal. On 25 March 1991, the Chinese Government was informed through its New Delhi Embassy, that the Dalai Lama wished to assist in the search for the authentic reincarnation of the late Panchen Lama. To facilitate this, the Chinese Government was informed that the Dalai Lama wished to send a delegation of high lamas and abbots to Lhamoi Latso, the sacred lake near Lhasa, to pray and observe prophetic visions in the lake which would guide them to the genuine reincarnation. After more than three months, the Chinese Government replied, saying that there was no need for outside interference in this matter and that the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama would be found by the responsible officials of Tashilhunpo Monastery. Notwithstanding these frustrating and disappointing experiences, the Dalai Lama did not want the situation to remain stalemated. In his address at the Yale University in October 1991, the Dalai Lama made a fresh overture to the Chinese Government by suggesting a personal visit to Tibet, in the accompaniment of some senior Chinese leaders, to make an on-the-spot assessment of the actual situation in Tibet. In the same spirit, the Dalai Lama sought a meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng, during the latter's visit to India in December 1991. These positive and constructive initiatives were also rejected. In view of these facts, the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, on 23 January 1992, passed a resolution stating that the Tibetan Exile Government should not initiate any new move for negotiations with China unless there was a positive change in the attitude of the Chinese leadership. The resolution, however, noted that the Tibetan Government would have no objection to negotiations if the overture came from the Chinese Government, either directly or through a third party. In April 1992, the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi called on Mr Gyalo Thondup and told him that the Chinese Government's position in the past had been "conservative", but that it was willing to be "flexible" if the Tibetans were prepared to be "realistic". He, therefore, invited Mr Thondup to visit China. In June Mr Thondup went to Beijing with the approval of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. On his return, he reported to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag of his meetings with Chinese officials. The report was discussed by the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies during its third session. Contrary to what the Chinese Ambassador had told Mr Thondup, there was no indication of flexibility in the Chinese Government's attitude. As a matter of fact, very serious accusations were made against the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. It was, therefore, found necessary to send a delegation to China, led by Mr Thondup, to explain and clarify the Exile Government's views on the points raised by the Chinese Government. The delegation was also to carry a personal letter and a detailed note from the Dalai Lama to Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. A three-member delegation was appointed, and they met Mr. Lui Guang-hui, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, on 17 September 1992 to discuss the arrangements. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government firmly believe that the only way to start negotiations for the peaceful solution of the Tibet problem is without preconditions from either side. It is encouraging to find that many Governments have supported this position.

[Vajradhara]

State of Tibet's environment


Introduction

Tibet is the prime source of Asia's great rivers. It also has the earth's loftiest mountains as well as the world's most extensive and highest plateau, ancient forests, and many deep valleys untouched by human disturbances. Traditional Tibetan economic and religious value systems led to the evolution of successful environmental protection practices. Their belief in the Buddhist teaching of Right Livelihood stresses the importance of "contentment" and discourages over-consumption. It also frowns upon over-exploitation of the earth's natural resources as this is perceived to harm other living beings and their habitat. As early as 1642, the Fifth Dalai Lama issued a Decree for the Protection of Animals and the Environment. Since then, such decrees have been issued annually. With the colonisation of Tibet by Communist China, Tibet's traditional environment protection system has given way to an "ecocide" of appalling proportions. The effects of this are especially notable in the grassland areas, the cropland areas, the forests, the water resource and the wildlife.

Grassland, cropland and Chinese agricultural policies
Tibet is 70 per cent grassland. Grasslands form the backbone of the country's animal husbandry-dominated agrarian economy. The domestic animal population is as big as 70 million and supports nearly a million herdsmen. Tibet's nomads have traditionally adapted themselves well to the needs of their fragile grasslands. Annual records of pasture use, systematic migrations of their herds of dri and yak, sheep and goats, and responsibility for sustainable use at the individual and community levels are traditional habits. Over the last four decades there has been widespread degradation of these vital pastures. The conversion of marginal lands to agriculture for Chinese settlers has become the greatest threat to Tibet's grasslands.

This has led to extensive desertification, rendering the land unusable for agriculture or grazing. This problem has especially devastated the vast grasslands in Amdo. The situation is made worse by the fencing of grasslands which have restricted the Tibetan nomads to ever smaller areas and disrupted their traditional migration practice. In Machu district of Amdo alone, one-third of the total area of over 10,000 square kilometre has been fenced for the horses, sheep and cattle of the Chinese army. Similarly, most of the better pasture lands in Ngapa, Golok and "Qinghai" have been reserved for the Chinese. Traditionally, the principal croplands are arable niches along the river valleys of Kham, the Tsangpo valley in U-Tsang, and the Machu valley in Amdo. The staple crop is barley, grown with other cereals and legumes.

The traditional agricultural system has organic principles, crop rotation, mixed crops, and periodic failures which are sustainable and appropriate to a fragile mountain environment. Grain yields in Tibet average 2,000 kg/ha in U-Tsang and higher still in the lower valleys of Amdo and Kham. This exceeds yields in comparable climates such as in Russia (1,700 kg/ha) and Canada (1,800 kg/ha). The need to feed the ever-increasing Chinese military and civil personnel and settlers and the export of agricultural produce has led to the extension of farmland onto steep and marginal terrain, an increase in the area under wheat (which the Chinese prefer to the Tibetan staple, barley) and the introduction of hybrid seeds, pesticides and chemical fertilizer. Disease has been regularly affecting new wheat varieties, and in 1979 destroyed the entire wheat crop. Prior to the influx of millions of Chinese settlers Tibetans had no need to increase production so drastically.

Forests and deforestation
In 1949, Tibet's ancient forests covered 221,800 square kilometres. By 1985 they stood at 134,000 square kilometres - almost half. Most forests grow on steep, isolated slopes in the river valleys of Tibet's low-lying southeastern region. The principal types are tropical montane and subtropical montane coniferous forest, with spruce, fir, pine, larch, cypress, birch, and oak among the main species. The tree line varies from 3,800 metres in the region's moist south to 4,300 metres in the semi- dry north. Tibet's forests were primarily old growth, with trees over 200 years old predominating. The average stock density is 272 cubic metres/ha, but U-Tsang's old growth areas reach 2,300 cubic metres/ha - the world's highest stock density for conifers. As new roads penetrate remote areas of Tibet the rate of deforestation increases. All roads, it should be noted, are built or aided by PLA or China's Forestry Ministry's teams of engineers and their costs are counted as expenditure to "develop" Tibet.

Once pristine forests are reached, the most common method of cutting is clear felling, which has led to the denudation of vast hill sides. Timber extraction until 1985 totalled 2,442 million cubic metres, or 40% of the 1949 forest stock, worth $54 billion. Deforestation is a major employer in Tibet: in the Kongpo area of the "TAR" alone, over 20,000 Chinese soldiers and Tibetan prisoners are involved in tree felling and transportation of timber. In 1949, Ngapa, in Amdo, had 2.20 million hectares of land under forest cover. Its timber reserve then stood at 340 million cubic meters. In the 1980s, it was reduced to 1.17 million hectares, with a timber reserve of only 180 million cubic meters. [Ngapa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Publishing House, 1985, pp. 149-154]. Similarly, during thirty years till 1985 China exploited 6.44 million cubic metres of timber from "Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture". Cut into a size measuring 30 centimetre wide and three metre long, and lined from end to end, this would be long enough to make two full circles round the globe. (Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu People's Publishing House, 1987, p.145) The growing degradation and desertification of the Tibetan Plateau, unique on earth and the planet's most extensive high land form, is continuing. This area influences atmospheric circulation and jet stream wind patterns over Asia and, according to scientists, may be related to the destabilisation of weather patterns over the northern hemisphere. Regeneration and afforestation have been minimal due to the extreme degree of land slope, soil and moisture, including high diurnal temperature variations and high soil surface temperatures. With such conditions the destructive effects of clear-felling are irreversible.

Water resource and hydropower
Tibet is Asia's principal watershed and the source of its major rivers. A substantial proportion of river flows in Tibet are stable or base flows coming from ground water and glacial sources. This is in marked contrast to river flows in most neighbouring countries, which are determined by seasonal rainfall patterns. Ninety per cent of Tibet's river run-off flows down across its borders, internal use accounting for less than 1 per cent of total river run-off. Today Tibet's rivers have developed extremely high sediment rates: The Machu (Huang Ho, or Yellow River), the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), the Drichu (Yangtze), and the Senge Khabab (Indus) are among the five most heavily-silted rivers in the world. The total area irrigated by these rivers, from the Machu basin in the east to the Senge Khabab in the west, covers 47 per cent of the earth's human population. Tibet also has over 2,000 natural lakes - some of which are sacred or otherwise play a special role in the people's culture - with a combined area of more than 35,000 square kilometres. Steep slopes and abundant river flows give Tibet an exploitable hydropower potential of 250,000 megawatts, the highest of any country in the world. The "TAR" alone has a potential of 200,000 megawatts. Tibet possesses the world's highest solar energy potential per unit after the Sahara, an estimated annual average of 200 kilocalorie/cm, as well as significant geothermal resources.

Despite such abundant potential from small, environmentally- benign sources, the Chinese have built huge dams, such as Longyang Xia, and are continuing to do so, such as the hydropower station at Yamdrok Yutso. Many of these projects are designed to tap Tibet's hydro potential to provide power and other benefits to the Chinese population and industries both in Tibet and China. But the environmental, human and cultural toll of these hydro-electricity projects will be borne by the Tibetans. While the Tibetans are displaced from their homes and lands, tens of thousands of Chinese workers are brought up from China to construct and maintain these dams. These dams have very little benefit for the local Tibetans who have no say over them. Take the case of Yamdrok Yutso hydro-power project. The Chinese claim that this project will greatly benefit the Tibetans. Tibetan people in general, particularly the late Panchen Lama and Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, opposed and effectively delayed its construction for several years. The Chinese, nevertheless, went ahead with the construction and today more than 1,500-strong PLA troops are guarding the construction area and no civilians are allowed near it.

Minerals and mining
According to official Chinese sources, Tibet has proven deposits of 126 minerals, with a significant share of the world's reserves in lithium, chromite, copper, borax, and iron. Amdo's oil fields produce over one million tons of crude oil per year. The network of roads and communications built by the Chinese in Tibet mirrors the locations of forests and mineral reserves indiscriminately exploited by the Chinese Government. With seven of China's 15 key minerals due to run out within this decade and major non-ferrous minerals virtually exhausted, the rate of mineral extraction from Tibet is rapidly increasing. It is believed that China plans to shift its major mining operations into Tibet by the end of this century. Environmental safeguards are virtually non-existent in Tibet's mines. Particularly in fragile terrains, this is leading to slope destabilisation, land degradation, and hazards to human health and life.

[Vajradhara]

Wildlife Many wild animals and birds have vanished through destruction of their habitat or have been slaughtered by indiscriminate hunting for sport and to furbish China's illicit trade in wildlife products. There have been numerous and continuing reports of Chinese soldiers using automatic weapons to wipe out herds of wild yaks and wild asses for sport. Unrestricted hunting of wildlife continues to take place.

Hunting "tours" organised for wealthy foreign clients - for trophies of endangered species - appear in the official Chinese news media regularly. For instance, "hunting tours" are being organised for wealthy sportsmen from the United States of America and Western Europe. These "hunters" can bag trophies of endangered species such as the Tibetan antelope (Pantholops hodgsoni) and the Argali sheep (Ovis ammon hodgsoni), species supposedly accorded the highest level of official protection. The hunts cost up to $35,000 for a Tibetan antelope, $23,000 for an Argali, $13,000 for a white-lipped deer (Cervus albirostris), $7,900 for a blue sheep (Pseudois nayaur), and $3,500 for a red deer (Cerrus elaphus). The present scenario is likely to result in the irrevocable loss of countless Tibetan species even before they have been discovered and studied.

Also, it constitutes a known threat to the very survival of species treasured in Tibetan culture and of immeasurable value to the world. The White Paper does admit that a number of animals are "on the verge of extinction". Similarly, the International Union for Conservation of Nature's 1990 Red List of Endangered Animal Species mentions 30 Tibetan animals. Chinese conservation measures for Tibet, except for areas now merged into Chinese provinces, were initiated long after similar efforts in China itself. Declared protected areas are said to cover 310,000 sq.km. or approximately 12 per cent of Tibet by 1991 end. The effectiveness of protection cannot be measured because of China's strictly limited access, plus secrecy concerning actual data.

Nuclear and other toxic wastes
China is reported to have stationed approximately 90 nuclear warheads in Tibet. The Ninth Academy, China's North-west Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy in Tibet's north-eastern area of Amdo, is reported to have dumped an unknown quantity of radioactive waste on the Tibetan plateau. According to a report released by International Campaign for Tibet, a Wastington, DC- based organisation:

Waste disposal methods were reported to be casual in the extreme. Initially, waste was put in shallow, unlined landfills ... The nature and quantity of radioactive waste generated by the Ninth Academy is still unknown. ... During the 1960s and 1970s, nuclear waste from the facility was disposed of in a roughshod and haphazard manner. Nuclear waste from the Academy would have taken a variety of forms - liquid slurry, as well as solid and gaseous waste. Liquid or solid waste would have been in adjacent land or water sites. [Nuclear Tibet, Washington, DC, 1993, p.18]

Official Chinese pronouncements have confirmed the existence in Tibet of the biggest uranium reserves in the world. Reports say that uranium is processed in Tibet itself and that many local Tibetans died after drinking contaminated water near a uranium mine in Ngapa, Amdo. The local Tibetans have also reported the birth of deformed humans and animals. Given the fact that underground water supplies in Amdo have been diminishing at a rapid rate, and useable underground water is very limited (a report estimated underground water reserve at 340 to 4.0 billion cubic feet, He Bochuan, pp.39), radioactive contamination of groundwater is of great concern. Since 1976 uranium has been mined and processed in Thewo and Zorge regions of Kham also. In 1991, Greenpeace exposed plans to ship toxic municipal sludge from the USA to China for use as "fertilizer" in Tibet. The use of similar toxic waste as fertilizer in the USA has been linked to outbreaks of diseases.

Conclusion
Tibet's complex environmental problems cannot be addressed by cosmetic changes like designating swathes of land as nature reserves or making laws for the people when the real perpetrator of environmental damage is the Government itself. There should be political will on the part of the Chinese leadership to restore rights to environment to the Tibetan people and allow them to follow their traditional conservationist practices. In keeping with the vision of the Dalai Lama, all of Tibet should be transformed into a zone of peace where humans and nature can dwell in harmonious coexistence. Such a Tibet, as the Dalai Lama said, should be completely demilitarised and must have a democratic form of government and an economic system that ensures the sustainable use of the country's natural resources to provide a decent standard of living for its people. Ultimately, this is in the long-term interest of all the neighbouring countries as environmental conditions in Tibet have major transboundary effects, notably in India, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Nearly half of the global population, particularly in these four countries, depend on the rivers of Tibet for their sustenance. Some of the major floods in these countries during the last decade have been attributed to deforestation-related siltation of Tibet's rivers. The destructive potential of these rivers increases each year as China continues the deforestation and uranium-related activities on the Roof of the World. China acknowledges "pollution in several sections of rivers". Since hydrological flows respect no international borders, it should be a cause of concern for Tibet's neighbouring countries who have the right to know which of their own rivers are polluted, how and by what. Unless an urgent action is taken now to stop this, the rivers of Tibet, which have brought joy and sustenance, may one day bring death and destruction.

[Nogodnomasters]

Don't you just hate it when China starts acting like an unnamed western super power. As the unnamed Super power seeks acceptance from China for its various foreign invasions, it must give a wink and nod to their involvement in Tibet.

Those Chinese just give imperialism a bad name. I am sure the US will help Tibet every bit as much as it helped East Timor. Just as soon as the Chinese government falls we will claim we supported Tibet the whole time (wink wink nudge nudge) and could our corporations please exploit and control your remaining natural resources?

[Vajradhara]

Originally Posted by Nogodnomasters

Don't you just hate it when China starts acting like an unnamed western super power. As the unnamed Super power seeks acceptance from China for its various foreign invasions, it must give a wink and nod to their involvement in Tibet.

Those Chinese just give imperialism a bad name. I am sure the US will help Tibet every bit as much as it helped East Timor. Just as soon as the Chinese government falls we will claim we supported Tibet the whole time (wink wink nudge nudge) and could our corporations please exploit and control your remaining natural resources?

Namaste,

do you mean to insinuate The United States? if so, you should dispense with the cuteness and simply say it.. this is the politics forum after all.

in point of fact, as i'm sure you read, the states did send the CIA to help formet an uprising in Tibet. much like the Suni uprising against Saddam is how it turned out though...

it really does bother me that any country, let alone the one that i, ostensibly, belong to, engages in commerce with a nation that oppresses people. sadly, international politics is rife with such instances.

as for China itself... they are going to have a huge problem on their hands very shortly. the change in the economic polcies have not benefited the entire nation.. only a very small, select few. if you recall, this is the reason for the orignal communist revolution in the country. the serfs are still serfs.. and still being taken advantage of.

it's one big, terrible mess that, unfortunately, isn't going to resolve itself anytime soon.

[Kaldayen]

Many thanks for that text Vajradhara! As a begginer in East-Asian Studies, I hadn't had the opportunity to study the Tibet situation yet. Thanks again. If you don't mind, I'll continue reading the rest in the next couple of days

Kal

[Nogodnomasters]

Originally Posted by Vajradhara

Namaste,

do you mean to insinuate The United States? if so, you should dispense with the cuteness and simply say it.. this is the politics forum after all.

in point of fact, as i'm sure you read, the states did send the CIA to help formet an uprising in Tibet. much like the Suni uprising against Saddam is how it turned out though...

it really does bother me that any country, let alone the one that i, ostensibly, belong to, engages in commerce with a nation that oppresses people. sadly, international politics is rife with such instances.

as for China itself... they are going to have a huge problem on their hands very shortly. the change in the economic polcies have not benefited the entire nation.. only a very small, select few. if you recall, this is the reason for the orignal communist revolution in the country. the serfs are still serfs.. and still being taken advantage of.

it's one big, terrible mess that, unfortunately, isn't going to resolve itself anytime soon.

I prefer to be cute. As for China, it is my understanding it is mostly the remote rural areas that are still in poverty, not the high East Coast section.

China has a strong military and is very much in control of that nation. An internal revolt could only occur when the military joins the people and turns on the government. I know of very few revolutions where this was not the case.

Even in the American Revolution there were a good number of British officers who refused to fight against the colonists because they considered them their fellow countrymen. This is why they had to hire German soldiers to come over here.

[Vajradhara]

Originally Posted by Nogodnomasters

I prefer to be cute. As for China, it is my understanding it is mostly the remote rural areas that are still in poverty, not the high East Coast section.

China has a strong military and is very much in control of that nation. An internal revolt could only occur when the military joins the people and turns on the government. I know of very few revolutions where this was not the case.

Even in the American Revolution there were a good number of British officers who refused to fight against the colonists because they considered them their fellow countrymen. This is why they had to hire German soldiers to come over here.

Namaste,

it's pretty bleak for most of China... there is an area called the Southern Economic Zone, near Taiwan, that is quite prosperous.. of course, this area is dominated by the Han.

there are a lot of different tribes of people in China.. and this still plays an important role in society... the Han represent the "priviledged" tribe, as it were.

in any event... the North East Economic Zone is in a tough bind... this was the major mfg area for the country, as such, most of the factories were state owned.. now that western style capatiolism is being implemented, these factories are being shut down and the workers tossed out.... except on the occassions where the factory can manage to privatize itself.

it's quite true that China's military is strong and well equipped... it is equally true that for a people comitted to a violent struggle, this is irrelevant. as it stands, the area of China called Xingjian is currently engaged in a violent resistence to Chinese rule. this country was called Lower Mongolia prior to being annexed.

besides... there is no love lost between India and China... China is currently occuppying land that India is disputing.. this fact is, i'm quite certain, the major reason why the West is so friendly with India now.

[Nogodnomasters]

I suspect the reason why the US is so friendly with India is because it doesn't want any funny business going on with Pakistan over the Kashmir, The US needs the aid of Pakistan to root out Al Qaida. It can't do that if Pakistan is spending it resources keeping India at bay.

[seattlegal]

bump.